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Although the current generation of Anglophone students in
Cameroon feels even more marginalized than their Franco-
phone counterparts because of their Anglophone identity, they
have actualfy displayed a rather ambivalent attitude towards
the Francophone-dominated regime that they hold responsible
for their predicament. On the one hand, there are students who
are seen as rebels and heroes. They have played a vanguard
role in the Anglophone protest and, following political
liberalization, have formed the leadership of the most militant
Anglophone nationalist movement. However on the other hand,
there are students who are seen as both predators and victims
of the regime. They have beenprepared tojoin theyouth militia
created by the regime to combat Anglophone organizations in
exchangefor a share in the ever-diminishing state resources.
Introduction
The dramatic changes that have been affecting the position of university
students in African countries since the 1980s are being highlighted in an
increasing number of studies (cf. Kpatinde 1991, Cruise O'Brien 1996, Lebeau
1997, Federici et al. 2000). Students in the first decades following African
independence belonged to the most privileged group in the political system and
were assured the desired elite status after graduation, but successive generations
have been faced with deteriorating living and study conditions on campuses and
bleak prospects after graduating.
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African universities are in deep crisis nowadays (cf. Lebeau & Ogunsanya
2000, Nyamnjoh & Jua 2002). Academie Standards have been falling rapidly
because universities lack the basic infrastructure needed to cope with the
massive growth in the student population (Mbembe 1985, Tedga 1988, Lebeau
1997, Konings 2002) and the severe economie crisis and the Implementation of
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are aggravating the Situation further.
The increasing withdrawal of state support for universities, university students
and university graduates is seen in the drastic cuts in university budgets, the
imposition of tuition fees and additional levies on the student population, and a
virtual halt in the recruitment of new graduates into already over-sized state
bureaucracies (Caffentzis 2000). Many graduates are finding themselves
obliged to defer their entry into adulthood indefinitely as they are unable to
achieve economie independence, to marry and start a family of their own. They
are also being forced to abandon their aspirations for elite status.
Given these conditions, the question to be posed is: how is the current
generation of African university students reacting to their growing marginaliza-
tion? Most of the existing studies (cf. Kpatinde 1991, Federici 2000, Amutabi
2002) claim that these students have refused to become a 'lost' or 'abandoned'
generation (Cruise O'Brien 1996: 56). To bring about the needed reforms in the
university system and society at large they have instead become engaged in
struggles against the corrupt and authoritarian political elite whom they hold
responsible for their predicament and have received the support of other groups
including secondary school students, their teachers and organized labour, all of
whom feel equally marginalized by the state (Bratton & Van de Walle 1992,
Albert 1995). In a few countries they have been at the forefront of struggles for
political liberalization (Smith 1997) but in most they have increased the
intensity of their struggles after the introduction of political liberalization. It has
created more space for students to voice their multiple grievances, to organize
and to establish alliances with newly founded Opposition parties and civil-
society organizations. While in the past, with few exceptions, African student
protest was sporadic, today it has become endemic in many countries,
continuing year after year in spite of frequent university closures in what
appears to have become protracted warfare. Federici and Caffentzis (2000: 115-
50) have published a chronology of African university students' struggles
between 1985 and 1998 that provides an impressive list of the violent confront-
ations between students and the forces of law and order in African states.
Some of the existing studies also attempt to explain why both parties appear
to prefer violence to dialogue and negotiations in solving student problems.
They emphasize that government authorities continue to look upon students as
'minors' or 'cadets' who, according to African tradition, should listen to their
elders and simply obey orders. These officials therefore often fail to take
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students and their grievances seriously and usually refuse to create channels of
regulär communication or to enter into peaceful negotiations. They continue to
present students as a privileged and unproductive minority group that, on the
basis of state largesse, is being offered the opportunity to préparé itself for its
future leading role in national reconstruction. Consequently, students are
expected to express their gratitude to the state through 'responsible' behaviour,
devoting their tirne to study and not to politics (Mbembe 1985: 53).' In these
circumstances, the use of violence has different meanings for the different
actors. For students, it is often the only means of pressing home their demands
to the government authorities. For government officials, it serves as a deterrent
to the cadets from engaging in any similar 'irresponsible' behaviour in the
future. As a result of increasing student activism, African governments have
been inclined to treat students as if they were their countries' major enemies,
turning campuses into war zones. Police Intervention and the occupation of
campuses by security forces are becoming routine in many places and so is the
presence of intelligence officers and police informants in classrooms (Felici
2000, Amutabi 2002, Konings 2002).
While the existing body of literature has helped to underscore the growing
importance of student politics in Africa, it nevertheless tends to present a one-
sided picture, usually considering students as a homogeneous group, notably
rebels and heroes. The Situation is obviously more complex. Besides the rebels,
there are students who tend to conform to the state model of student behaviour
which the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, defmed in 1991 as follows: 'La
politique aux politiciens, l'école aux écoliers' (Konings 2002). They usually
project themselves as responsible students who refuse to participate in any form
of student activism, claiming that they have no other interest than advancing
their academie careers. In addition, there are students who are designated as
victims and predators alike. Unlike the rebels, they still appear to have faith in
the state as a vehicle for upward mobility. They belong to the group of citizens
that, as Bratton (1989: 414-15) has acutely observed, 'remains drawn to the
state, because, even in diminished circumstances, it remains a major source of
spoils and one of the available channels for getting what little there is to get'.
They are eager to seek favours from the state in exchange for their expressed
loyalty to the regime and its ideology and their offers of rendering services to
the state. This is a group of clients that can be easily manipulated by the ruling
regime to do any 'dirty work', especially in recruiting for the militia that were
1 Although they have often waraed students that the university is a temple of learning
and not a haven of politics, one-party and military regimes have never discouraged
student motions and demonstrations of support. They have often even encouraged the
creation of a youth wing at universities.
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created by the state to combat student rebels and other opponents of the regime.
In this chapter, I focus on Anglophone students in Cameroon, who feel even
more marginalized than their Francophone counterparts because of the allegedly
second-class citizenship of Anglophones in the post-colonial Francophone-
dominated state. In the first section I bnefly descnbe the development of the
Anglophone identity, nationahsm and organization. This serves as a background
for my subsequent discussion of the role of Anglophone students in their current
struggles against Francophone dominance. In the second section, I argue that
Anglophone students have played a vanguard role m Anglophone protest
actions in the wake of Paul Biya's accession to power in 1982. In the third
section, I show that two new Anglophone youth organizations have emerged
during politica! liberalization, in which students are playing a leading role.
These organizations clearly differ in their attitude towards the Francophone-
dominated state.
On the one hand, there is the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL)
that has identified itself with the Anglophone struggle to such an extent that its
members are even prepared to defer their entry mto adulthood and elite status
until the 'Anglophone problem' has been solved. It agrees with the leadership of
the newly created Anglophone movements on the main aim of the Anglophone
struggles - namely the creation of an independent Anglophone state - but it
disagrees with their strategy of realizing this objective. In sharp contrast to the
Anglophone elite who have continued to pursue mdependence through peaceful
negotiations, the SCYL opted for armed struggle after Paul Biya's persistent
refusal to enter mto any meanmgful negotiations with the Anglophone
movements.
On the other hand, the President Biya's Youths (PRESBY) has claimed to be
opposed to the Anglophone struggle, havmg expressed its undivided loyalty to
President Biya and his 'New Deal' ideals in exchange for a share in the ever-
dimimshing pool of state resources, thus facihtating their entry into adulthood
and elite status. PRESBY has been transformed by the regime into a militia that
intimidates and terrorizes the SCYL and other Anglophone organizations.
The development of Anglophone nationalism and organization
The emergence and development of what has come to be called the 'Anglo-
phone problem' has been explamed by several authors (cf. Konmgs &
Nyamnjoh 1997, 2000, 2003, Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1996, Eyoh 1998). Most
agree that its roots can be traced back to the partitioning after the First World
war of the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916) between the
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French and English victors, first as mandates under the League of Nations and
later as trusts under the United Nations. Following this partitioning, the British
acquired two narrow and non-contiguous regions bordering Nigeria in the
western part of the country. The southern part, and the focus of this chapter, was
christened Southern Cameroons, while the northern part became known as
Northern Cameroons.2 Significantly, the British territory was much smaller than
the French, comprising only about one fifth of the total area and population of
the former German colony.
The partitioning of the territory into English and French spheres had some
significant consequences for future political developments. Importantly, it laid
the foundation for the construction of Anglophone and Francophone identities
in the territory and the populations of each sphere came to see themselves as a
distinct Community, defined by differences in language and inherited colonial
traditions of education, law, public administration and worldview. Second,
while French Cameroon was incorporated into the French colonial empire as a
distinct administrative unit separate from neighbouring French Equatorial
Africa, the British Cameroons was administered as part of Nigeria, leading to a
blatant neglect of its socio-economic development and an increasing migration
of Nigerians, notably Igbos, to the Southern Cameroons where they came to
dominate the regional economy.
With the approaching independence of Nigeria in 1960, the population of the
British Trust Territory had to decide on its own political future. It soon became
evident mat the majority of the Southern Cameroonians would opt for the
creation of an independent state. That their expressed wish was eventually not
honoured must be attributed to two main factors. First, internal divisions among
the Anglophone political elite prevented them from rally ing behind the majority
option in the territory. Second, and maybe even more importantly, the United
Nations refused, with the complicity of the British, to put the option of an
independent Southern Cameroons state to the voters in the UN-organized
plebiscite of 11 February 1961 on the grounds that the creation of another tiny
state was politically undesirable (and likely to contribute to a further
'Balkanization' of Africa) and economically unviable. Being deprived of this
preferred option, Southern Cameroonians were given what amounted to
Hobson's choice: independence by joining Nigeria or reunification with Franco-
phone Cameroon, which had become independent in 1960 under the new name
of the Republic of Cameroon. In the end, they chose the lesser of the two evils
2 During the 1961 UN-organized plebiscite on the political future of the British Trust
Territory, the Northern Cameroons voted for Integration into Nigeria. For the history of
the Northern Cameroons, see, for instance, Le Vine (1964) and Welch (1966).
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but their vote in favour of reunification appeared to be more a rejection of
continuous ties with Nigeria, which had proved to be harmful to Southern
Cameroonian development, than a vote for union with Francophone Cameroon,
a territory with a different cultural heritage and that at the time was involved in
a violent civil war (Joseph 1977).
By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone political
elite had hoped to enter into a loose federal union as a way of protecting their
territory's minority status and cultural heritage. Instead, it soon became evident
that the Francophone political elite preferred a highly centralized, unitary state
as a means of promoting national unity and economie development. While the
Francophone elite received strong support from the French during constitutional
negotiations, the Anglophone elite was virtually abandoned by the British who
deeply resented the Southern Cameroons option for reunification with Franco-
phone Cameroon (Awasom 2000). As a result, rumours quickly spread through
the region that Charles de Gaulle looked upon the Southern Cameroons as 'a
small gift of the Queen of England to France' (Jua & Konings forthcoming). In
the end, during constitutional talks at Foumban in July 1961, the Francophone
elite was only prepared to accept a highly centralized federation, regarding it as
merely a transitional phase to a unitary state. Such a federation demanded
relatively few amendments to the 1960 constitution of the Republic of
Cameroon. In his recent book, Pierre Messmer (1998: 134-35), one of the last
French high commissioners in Cameroon and a close advisor of President
Ahmadou Ahidjo, admitted that hè and others knew at the time that the so-
called federal constitution provided merely a 'sham federation', which was
'save for appearance, an annexation of West Cameroon (the new name of the
Southern Cameroons after reunification)'.3 Under the new constitution, West
Cameroon lost most of the limited autonomy it had enjoyed as part of the
Nigerian federation (Ardener 1967, Stark 1976). When Ahidjo created a unitary
state in 1972 in blatant disregard for constitutional provisions, there was in
reality little left of the federation, except perhaps in name (Benjamin 1972). To
reduce the danger of any future united Anglophone action, Ahidjo then decided
to divide the erstwhile federated state of West Cameroon into two provinces,
albeit well aware of the internal contradictions within the Anglophone
community between the coastal-forest people in South West Province and the
Grassfields people in Norm West Province (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997: 211-
13). What many regarded as one of the last visible symbols of the 1961 union
3 Following reunification, the Federal Republic of Cameroon consisted of the federated
state of East Cameroon (formerly French Cameroon) and the federated state of West
Cameroon (formerly Southern Cameroons).
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was removed in 1984 when Ahidjo's successor, Paul Biya, abolished the
appellation 'United Republic of Cameroon' and replaced it with 'Republic of
Cameroon', which was, signifïcantly, the name of the Francophone part of the
country when it became independent in 1960.
An even more decisive factor in the development of the Anglophone
problem, however, was the nation-state project after reunification. For the
Anglophone population, nation-building has been driven by the firm
determination of the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone
minority in the post-colonial state and to erase the cultural and institutional
foundations of Anglophone identity. Anglophones have regularly been relegated
to inferior positions in the national decision-making process and have been
constantly underrepresented in ministerial as well as senior and middle-ranking
positions in the administration, the military and parastatals (cf. Kofele-Kale
1986, Takougang & Krieger 1998). There is general agreement that Anglo-
phones have been exposed to a carefully considered policy aimed at eroding
their language and institutions even though Francophone political leaders had
assured their Anglophone counterparts during the constitutional talks on
reunification that the inherited colonial differences in language and institutions
would be respected in the bilingual union. And, last but not least, the relative
underdevelopment of the Anglophone region shows that it has not benefited
substantially from its rieh resources, particularly oil. Gradually this created an
Anglophone consciousness: the feeling of being recolonized and marginalized
in all spheres of public life and thus of being second-class citizens in their own
country. The co-optation of the Anglophone elite into the 'hegemonie alliance'
(Bayart 1979) and the autocratie nature of the post-colonial regimes prevented
Anglophones from openly organizing in defence of their interests until political
liberalization in the early 1990s.
Given the deep resentment in the Anglophone region of Francophone
dominance in the post-colonial state, it is not surprising that the country's first
Opposition party emerged in Anglophone Cameroon. In 1990 the Social
Democratie Front (SDF) was formed in Bamenda, the capital of the Norm West
Province, demanding liberalization of public space and capitalizing on populär
frustrations among Anglophones after three decades of marginalization. lts
chairman was John Fru Ndi, who was to enjoy widespread popularity among the
urban masses because of his courage and populist style of leadership. After a
massive rally to launch the SDF on 26 May 1990 ended in the death of six
young Anglophones, the state-controlled media tried to deny government
responsibility for this bloody event and to distort the facts. Leading members of
the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratie Movement (CPDM),
strongly condemned the Anglophones for this 'treacherous action' and what
they considered the premature birth of multipartyism in the post-colonial state.
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Their reaction to this peaceful demonstration shocked many people. Anglo-
phone Cameroonians were termed 'Biafrans', referred to as 'enemies in the
house' and were asked by the then Minister of Territorial Administration,
Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, 'to go elsewhere' if they were dissatisfied with
national unity.
The leaders of the SDF helped to turn the Anglophone region into a veritable
hotbed of rebellion leading to fierce confrontations with the regime in power,
especially during the 1991-92 'ghost town' campaign, which was essentially a
prolonged demonstration of civil disobedience organized by the SDF and the
allied Opposition parties to force the Biya government to hold a sovereign
national conference (Mbu 1993). The impact of this on the Anglophone
Community was particularly visible during the ensuing presidential elections
when Fru Ndi received 86.3 per cent and 51.6 per cent of the votes cast in the
North West and South West Provinces respectively. It is hardly surprising that
Biya's declared victory in these fraudulent elections was a traumatic experience
in Anglophone Cameroon that sparked off violent pretests throughout the North
West against his 'theft of Fru Ndi's victory'.
Paradoxically, although the SDF "and Fru Ndi contributed immensely to
Anglophone consciousness and action, the party increasingly presented itself as
a national rather than an Anglophone party as evidenced by its growing mem-
bership in Francophone Cameroon, notably among the neighbouring Bamileke,
who are closely related to the ethnic groups in the North West Province and are
inclined to see the SDF as a springboard to political power (Socpa 2002).
Subsequently, Anglophone interests came to be first and foremost represented
and defended by associations and pressure groups that had been created by the
Anglophone elite in the aftermath of political liberalization in December 1990.
The newly created Anglophone movements were able to place the Anglo-
phone problem on the national and international agenda. In April 1993, they
organized the First All Anglophone Conference (AAC I) in Buea, the former
capital of West Cameroon. It turned out to be a landmark in the history of
Anglophone Cameroon, bringing together over 5,000 members of the Anglo-
phone elite. Signifïcantly, some leading members of the old-guard politicians or
'Foumban generation', like John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna (the
Anglophone architects of reunification), expressed their satisfaction with the
meeting and apologized for their shortcomings in representing Anglophone
interests, especially during the federation era, and handed over the relay baton
to a new generation of Anglophone technocrats, the leaders of the newly created
Anglophone movements (Wache & Fualefeh 1993). The Buea Declaration,
which was issued after this historie meeting, listed the numerous Anglophone
grievances about Francophone domination, assimilation and exploitation, and
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called for the return to a two-state (Anglophone-Francophone) federation (All
Anglophone Conference 1993).
The Biya government's persistent refusal to enter into any negotiations
caused a growing radicalization among Anglophone movements. In the so-
called Bamenda Proclamation, adopted by the Second All Anglophone Con-
ference (AAC II) held in Bamenda from 29 April-1 May 1994, it was stipulated
that 'should the government either persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful
constitutional talks or fail to engage in such talks within a reasonable time, the
Anglophone leadership would proclaim the revival of the independence and
sovereignry of the Anglophone territory and take all measures necessary to
secure, defend and preserve the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the
said country' (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997: 218-20).
Following the AAC II, the Anglophone movements provocatively re-intro-
duced the name of Southern Cameroons to refer to the Anglophone territory in
an attempt to 'make it clear that our struggles are neither of an essentially
linguistic character nor in defence of an alien colonial culture. ... but are aimed
at the restoration of the autonomy of the former Southern Cameroons which has
been annexed by the Republic of Cameroon' .4 The umbrella organization of all
the Anglophone movements was subsequently named the Southern Cameroons
National Council (SCNC). lts leadership soon adopted a secessionist stand,
striving for an independent Southern Cameroons state through peaceful
negotiations with the regime, the 'sensitization' of the regional population and a
diplomatic offensive. A sense of euphoria spread through Anglophone
Cameroon when a SCNC delegation returned from a mission to the United
Nations in 1995. During rallies attended by huge crowds in several Anglophone
towns, the delegation displayed a huge UN flag, claiming it had received it from
the United Nations to show that the Southern Cameroons was still a UN trust
territory and that independence was only a matter of time.5
From 1996 onwards, however, Anglophone movements appeared to lose
their initial momentum. Two factors were primarily responsible for this
development. First, the Biya government was able to neutralize the Anglophone
4 SCNC press release reprinted in Cameroon Post, 16-23 August 1994, p. 3.
5 The SCNC leaders alleged that the proper procedures for the enactment and
amendment of the federal constitution had not been followed by Ahidjo and that
Francophone Cameroon had seceded from the union in 1984 when the Biya government
unilaterally changed the country's name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the
Republic of Cameroon, the name of independent Francophone Cameroon prior to
reunification. From this perspective, they claimed that the Trust Temtory of Southern
Cameroons had never really ceased to exist or had been revived. They therefore still
believed in continued UN responsibility for the Southern Cameroons.
movements to a large extent by employing a number of well-known tactics
including divide-and-rule, co-opting Anglophone leaders into the regime, and
severe repression. Second, there was the problem of leadership. With the
resignation of its founding fathers, the SCNC lacked competent and committed
leadership. Given the leadership problem and the government's reluctance to
enter into any negotiations, a generational conflict developed within the Anglo-
phone movements between the new generation of Anglophone leaders, who
continued to adhere to a negotiated Separation from La République du
Cameroun,6 and the youths, who had concluded that the independence of
Southern Cameroons would only be achieved through armed struggle. The
Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) in particular opted for the latter
strategy.
However, it would be a grave error to assume that the Anglophone
movements became fully paralyzed or even defeated by divisive and repressive
government tactics and their own organizational and strategie shortcomings. Of
late, Anglophone struggles appear to have acquired new impetus. On 30
December 1999, Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong, an SCNC activist with
close ties to the SCYL, took over the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV)
station in Buea proclaiming the restoration of the independence of the former
Bristish Southern Cameroons. This was followed by the nomination of a
provisional government and the announcement of a coat of arms, a flag and a
national anthem.
Significantly, due to these and past events, an increasing number of the pro-
government Anglophone and Francophone elite now acknowledge, after long
years of public denial, that there is indeed an Anglophone problem. In January
1999, even President Biya admirted for the first time, albeit in a dismissive
fashion, that such a problem existed, even if hè perceived it as one created by a
handful of hotheads and vandals. Still, he has not yet shown any interest in
negotiating with Anglophone movements in spite of regulär appeals by Anglo-
phone, Francophone and international dignitaries for dialogue to find a solution
to the Anglophone problem.7
6 Reference to the mcumbent regime as the government of La République du
Cameroun, the name adopted by Francophone Cameroon at independence, has become
a key signifier in the replotting of the country's constitutional history as a progressive
consolidation of the recolomzation and annexation of Anglophone Cameroon by the
post-colonial Francophone-dominated state. See Eyoh (1998: 264).
7 For example, during his visit to Cameroon in May 2000, the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan pleaded for dialogue between Anglophone and Francophone leaders.
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The vanguard role of Anglophone students in Anglophone
nationalist struggles
In the wake of the limited degree of liberalization that Paul Biya introduced
after assuming power in November 1982 (Takougang & Krieger 1998: 76-78),
Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé were the first to voice long-
standing Anglophone grievances. Their initiative can be explained by the many
hardships they experienced at the University of Yaoundé-the only university in
Cameroon until the 1993 university reforms (Konings 2002). Though officially
a bilingual institution, the University of Yaoundé has clearly remained a
Francophone institute. Not only is it based on the French university system but
courses are mostly given in French, thus putting English-speaking students at a
disadvantage.
Government announcements of educational reforms in 1983 fuelled dis-
content among Anglophone students, which eventually led to their spontaneous
organization. In September of that year, the Minister of National Education
promulgated an order modifying the Anglophone General Certificate of
Education (GCE) examination by making it similar to the Baccalauréat. The
order was apparently intended to facilitate the entry of Anglophone students
into professional and technical institutes in Cameroon, which were exclusively
based on the French system. Anglophone students, however, interpreted the
proposed reform as a subtle attempt by the Francophone-dominated state to
absorb the Anglophone educational system. They maintained that the problem
of Anglophone exclusion from the country's professional and technical
institutes could not be resolved by assimilation but rather by the creation of
institutes based on the English system.
The students used the unpopulär educational reform issue to express some of
their other grievances, including the dismissal of Dr Bisong, an Anglophone
lecturer in the Faculty of Law and Economics, simply because hè refused to
yield to pressure by Francophone students to teach in French. In a petition
addressed to the Minister of National Education, they took up the matter as
follows:
With regard to the University of Yaoundé, we strongly condemn the discrimination
in the teaching languages as glaringly exemplified by the ignominious suppression
of the accountancy courses offered in English by Dr Bisong for the sole reason that
such courses were offered in English. The Francophone students of the department
had protested to the Chancellor of the University that such important courses could
not be delivered in English. Immediately Dr Bisong was accused of inefficiënt
delivery of his lessons and they were handed over to a Francophone lecturer. The
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inefficiency was surely the use of the wrong language and not the substance of
They demanded his immediate and unconditional reinstatement, and called for a
more rigorous policy of bilingualism based on justice, equality and academie
honesty.
They then began to demonstrate and boycott classes. Instead of looking for
ways to solve their grievances, government and university authorities initially
tried to crush the students' actions by using extreme police brutality. This
strengthened the students' belief that the authorities had no genuine concern for
their plight. The Situation did not calm down until eleven days later when
students were informed that the Anglophone president of the National
Assembly, Solomon Tandeng Muna, along with other Anglophone political
elites, was to transmit an important message to mem from the head of state.
During the meeting, Muna said that the head of state was requesting that the
students go back to class and pursue their studies while their grievances and
other matters affecting their education received appropriate attention. He
stressed that none of them would be allowed to raise any questions about the
president's message because no parliamentarian would ever dare to do so.
Expecting the students' respect either as the president of parliament where their
parents met to discuss important issues, or at least as their 'white-haired
grandfather', hè asked them to applaud the president's message and to go back
to class calmly and quietly, adding that 'a word to the wise is enough'. But the
most radical students were not yet willing to listen to their elders and questioned
the authenticity of the message since no written statement signed by the
president had been handed over to the students during the meeting. They only
agreed to call off the strike when the füll presidential message was broadcast
nationwide in the evening, announcing the Installation of a commission of
highly qualified and experienced Anglophones and Francophones to look into
the students' grievances. It is striking that no report has ever been published by
this commission and that Anglophone struggles for the preservation of the GCE
have continued to the present day (Nyamnjoh 1996: 19-39).
In an open letter in 1985, Anglophone students urgently appealed to their
parents 'to assume squarely their responsibilities before history concerning the
grave [Anglophone] identity Situation and help solve the problem'. They
summed up the Anglophone population's multitude of grievances and those of
the Anglophone students in particular and requested their parents take imme-
8 Petition of English-speaking students from the University of Yaoundé to the Minister
of National Education, dated 19 November 1983, reproduced in Mukong (1990: 26).
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diäte action: 'apart from drawing up a new constitution, justice also requires the
establishment of a fully-fledged Enghsh-speaking university based on the
educational principles we cherish'. Should their parents fail to solve the
Anglophone problem, they threatened to resort to violent action in the future.9
Apparently, this letter was not supported by the entire Anglophone student
population. A group calling itself'The Anglophone Students of the New Deal"0
strongly protested against the behaviour of students 'who falsely claim that the
Anglophone Community is being oppressed and threaten to disturb the scarcity
and peace of our United Kingdom'. These 'subversive' elements should instead
'take stock of the achievements of the Man of the New Deal [Paul Biya]
towards better Integration of all ethnic and linguistic communities'. Most
probably, this protest action had been organized by the then single party that
used some Anglophone students to discredit their colleagues and the Anglo-
phone cause in exchange for immediate or future rewards."
Relations between Anglophone students, the government and the university
authorities rapidly deteriorated from the early 1990s onwards. On 26 May 1990,
a group of students, most of them Anglophones, marched m support of
launching the SDF m Bamenda and the introduction of multipartyism in the
country. The government press accused them of singing the Nigerian national
anthem (Kamto 1993). The implication of this false claim was that Anglo-
phones did not see themselves as Cameroonians but rather as Nigerians or -
even more common in government discourse - secessionist Biafrans.
Subsequently, the gendarmes harassed and brutalized the demonstrators, looted
their property and arrested about three hundred of them. This march by Anglo-
phone students incited disaffection and resentment among the autochthonous
Beti population on and off campus, which tended to support the ruling CPDM
party led by President Biya, who was himself a Beti.12 Some Beti landlords even
threatened to remove Anglophone students from their houses. To forestall any
9 Open letter to all English-speaking parents of Cameroon from the English-speaking
students of the North West and South West Provinces, dated 20 August 1985,
reproduced in Mukong (1990: 109-19).
10 After assuming power in 1982, Paul Biya promised the Cameroonian people a New
Deal.
" The Anglophone Students of the New Deal, 'Open Letter to the Cameroonian
Patriotic Students of the North West and South West', reproduced in Nyamnjoh (1996:
64-68).
12 It is important to emphasize here that the name 'Beti' as an ethnic label is a
historically circumscribed construct and subject to constant change. Since the 1980s, the
term has come to cover a number of ethnic groups in the Centre and South Provinces of
Cameroon, in particular the Bulu and Eton or Ewondo. President Biya belongs to the
Bulu group. See Socpa (2002).
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further student protests, the regime stationed gendarmes permanently on
campuses.
As I have shown elsewhere (Konings 2002), the political liberalization
process that started in December 1990 not only created space for students to
organize in defence of their interests but also tended to encourage a further
polarization among student factions along party and ethno-regional Unes. On the
one hand, there emerged what was initially called the National Coordination of
Cameroon Students that later changed its name to the Students' Parliament or
simply 'Parliament'. It was by far the largest student union on campus. The core
of its membership and leadership was formed by Anglophone and Bamileke
students who in common parlance are often referred to as 'Anglo-Bami'
students. Parliament soon came under the influence of the Opposition parties,
notably the SDF. It agreed with the Opposition that the regime had to be
overthrown in order to bring about real change in society at large and within the
university in particular. Anglophone members also participated in the
Anglophone struggles. Followmg AAC I and the Buea Declaration in 1993,
they created the Cameroon Anglophone Students' Association (CANSA), which
operated under the umbrella of the SCNC and participated in various actions
undertaken by the SCNC. Parliament members often presented themselves as
revolutionaries who were prepared to use all the means at their disposal,
including demonstrations, strikes and acts of vandalism, should the regime and
the university authorities fail to listen to or give in to their demands.
On the other hand, a Committee for Self-Defence, a vigilante group or
militia, was set up by the regime to counteract the actions of Parliament. lts
membership and leadership was mainly made up of Beti students. Nevertheless,
some students from other ethnic groups were also part of the Self-Defence
group, for example, a few of its leaders were Anglophone and Bamileke
students. They and other non-Beti members were recruited by the regime to
give the public the impression that the Self-Defence group was not an
exclusively Beti affair but an organization of responsible students who were
prevented from peacefully continuing their studies by the political actions of
Parliament 'rebels' and 'vandals'. The Self-Defence group was well rewarded
for its services: its members were given cash and, in some cases, free accommo-
dation. A few leaders were even given lucrative jobs after graduation despite the
free/e on public-sector employment. Since the Committee for Self-Defence was
made up of only a small minority of students, they were allowed to carry
weapons - clubs, knives and pistols - to attack Parliament members and
sympathizers. It usually worked closely with other, even more extremist, Beti
vigilante groups on campus, particularly the self-styled Direct Action group that
openly declared that the University of Yaoundé was on Beti land and thus
should fall under Beti control. It claimed that the Anglo-Bami students should
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either recognize Beti control or 'go home'. Following the formation of the
Committee for Self-Defence and the Beti vigilante groups, which received
logistic support from the forces of law and order, Parliament created its own
commandos to fïght these hostile groups and to protect its members.
The University of Yaoundé barely functioned from 1990 to 1996, with
university life being repeatedly paralyzed by student protests and unprecedented
violent confrontations between the two camps. I mention here only the three
most important confrontations. The first was in 1991 when Parliament members
marched in support of the Opposition parties' call for the holding of a sovereign
national conference and an unconditional general amnesty for political prisoners
and exiles. The second took place in 1993 after Parliament's protest against the
introduction of university tuition fees and the third occurred in 1996 followmg
Parliament's resistance to the university authorities' imposition of special levies
on students in addition to tuition fees (Konings 2002).
Interestingly, from the mid-1990s Parliament and the Self-Defence group
became the cradle of two new Anglophone youth groups which turned out to be
fierce opponents in the on-going Anglophone struggle: on the one hand, the
Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and on the other, President Biya's
Youths (PRESBY). Both groups sought to strengthen their positions by
extending their membership from the Anglophone university student population
to other sectors of well-educated Anglophone youths who were facing similar
educational and employment problems. These included university graduates,
university dropouts and other sections of the educated youth, many being either
unemployed or scraping together a meagre existence in the informal sector.
The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL)
The SCYL was founded in Buea on 28 May 1995 to remforce the role of the
educated Anglophone youth in the Anglophone struggle. It vowed to 'revive,
defend, protect and preserve the independence and sovereignty of the once
nation, the Southern Cameroons' and to serve as the militant youth wing of the
SCNC.13 lts original leadership was largely made up of Anglophone members of
Parliament and its membership was composed of 'young people who do not see
any future for themselves and who would prefer to die fighting man continue to
submit to the fate imposed on Southern Cameroons by La République du
Cameroun'.'4 SCYL members perceived the creation of an independent
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Southern Cameroons state as the only avenue to a better future for themselves
and the Anglophone population as a whole. They were even in the habit of
swearing under oath to make the necessary sacrifices for the achievement of this
goal and to never betray the Anglophone cause. Their fanatical commitment to
the Anglophone struggle actually gave them a new feeling of self-esteem.
In 1996, soon after its foundation, the SCYL began to express its discontent
with the Anglophone movements' rapid loss of momentum. It blamed the new
SCNC leadership chaired by Henry Fossung, a retired ambassador, for its
armchair approach to Southern Cameroons' independence as evidenced by its
failure to mobilize the Anglophone population in the face of increasing
government repression and its continued advocacy of dialogue with the Franco-
phone-dominated state in spite of the Biya government's persistent failure to
enter into meaningful negotiation with the SCNC. Having learnt from their
Parliament days that violence was the only means of pressing home their
demands with the autocratie Biya regime, the SCYL leaders declined to adhere
to the SCNC motto of 'the force of argument' any longer. They instead adopted
a new motto, namely 'the argument of force', which expressed their determi-
nation to achieve the independence of Southern Cameroons through armed
struggle. Little wonder then that the relationship between the SCYL and the
SCNC became even more strained.
While preparing for action in both Anglophone provinces, the SCYL was
unexpectedly faced with the detention of its chairman, Mr Ebenezer Akwanga,
followmg the failure of its members to steal explosives from the Razel
Company in Jakiri in the Norm West Province during the night of 23-24 March
1997. It immediately reacted by attacking some military and civil establish-
ments in the North West Province between 27-31 March. According to official
reports, three gendarmes and seven umdentified assailants were killed in these
operations. The government paper, the Cameroon Tribune, claimed that 'nearly
500 people had been trained to enable that part of the country to secede' and
another newspaper, the pro-government Le Patriote went even further, claiming
that '2000 gangsters had been trained to effect the liberation of Southern
Cameroons'.15 Not even the passage of time has enabled the truth of these
charges to be ascertained. Government repression of this ill-planned revolt was
out of all proportJon. It ruthlessly killed, tortured, raped and arrested hundreds
of local men and women, and forced many others to go into exile. Above all, it
seized the opportunity to clamp down on the SDF and the SCNC, accusing both
13 SCYL, 'Seventh Anniversary of the SCYL', BSCNation, 27 May 2002.
14 See Mr Fidelis Chiabi, chairman of the former Anglophone Youth Council, in
Cameroon Post, 1-2 February 1994, p. 7.
15 Cited m L'Expression, no. 107, 8 April 1997, p. 8.
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organizations of being responsible for the uprising.16 A considerable number of
SCNC and SCYL members were arrested and imprisoned in Yaoundé. Some
died while in prison and others were not brought to trial until 1999 when they
were not treated as political prisoners but were charged with criminal offences
(Ball Maps 2002).
The SCNC chairman, Henry Fossung, who had gone into hiding after the
revolt, publicly denied any SCNC involvement insisting 'that the SCNC motto
"the force of argument and not the argument of force" has remained today as
valid as yesterday'.17 He instead claimed that the incident had been orchestrated
by a desperate government in an attempt to frustrate the legitimate struggles of
the Southern Cameroons people to restore their independence. Strikingly,
following the revolt, the SCNC leadership appeared to be even less inclined to
sensitize and mobilize the Anglophone population. It was only after the
proclamation of independence by Justice Frederick Ebong on 30 December
1999 that a more committed and radical leadership seized power in the SCNC.
There is sufficient proof that state brutality and torture have failed to dampen
the SCYL tenacity and fervour to achieve its objectives. One indication is the
following Submission of SCYL President Ebenezer Akwanga before the
military tribunal in Yaoundé in 1999:
I am the National President of the SCYL. Our fathers who took us into reunification
have told us that its terms are being grossly and flagrantly disrespected. I believe in
the SCNC which is fighting a just cause, to see how the violation of the terms of
reunification can be corrected. (The Post, 19 July 1999)
Another indication is the publication by the SCYL of a document entitled 'The
Southern Cameroons Independence is Here and Now' in which the SCYL
champions a 'people's war' which 'has to be aggressive, not cool and cautious,
bold and audacious, violent, and an expression of icy, disdainful hatred'. In
furtherance of this goal, it reaffirms its commitment to the Anglophone cause:
Nothing can stop us, we are not intimidated by the spectre of repression; today
it is me, tomorrow it would be you."8
16 In a report that was füll of factual errors and based on spurious evidence, Jeune
Afrique Economie supported the Biya government's allegation that the SCNC was
responsible for the revolt. See Jeune Afrique Economie, no. 239, 14 April 1997, p. 8.
The journal's support of the Biya government's allegation is not altogether surprising.
Professor Titus Edzoa, a former Secretary-General at the Presidency, once revealed that
the journal was used for public relations purposes by the regime. To this end, the regime
had funded the journal to the tune of FCFA 1.5 billion (or US$ 3 million).
17 Le Messager, 23 April 1997, p. 8.
18 The Post, 15 May 2000, p. 3. For a reiteration of this position, see The Post, 24
Confronted with severe repression in Cameroon, the SCYL was forced
underground Like the Mouvement des Farces Démocratiques de la Casamance
(MFDQ in Senegal (De Jong 2001: 211-15), it has almost become a secret
society for security purposes. During my fieldwork I only succeeded m meeting
some of its leaders through the intermediary of a high-rankmg SCNC leader and
even during the actual interviews I received little Information about the size
organizational set-up, weapons and plans of the SCYL. I discovered later that
most SCYL members lack this knowledge memselves and simply wart for
instructions from their local leaders. Having become painfully aware that their
organization still lacked the necessary weapons and training to engage m
regulär guerrilla warfare against the large and well-equipped Camerooman
armed forces," the SCYL leaders apparently decided after the d1Smal failure of
the 1997 revolt to temporarily resort to less controllable forms of action.
The SCYL leadership in exile has discovered the importance of the Internet,
using it to raise Anglophone consciousness and promote the visibihty of the
Anglophone cause in the Cameroonian and international commumty, mus
frustrating the regulär attempts of the Francophone-dominated state to control
Information to the outside world and cover up its frequently brutal repression of
SCNC and SCYL actions. Strikingly, they have also become deeply conceraed
with naming and flagging. Although such activities may imtially appear as
somewhat 'banal' (Billig 1995), they turn out to be closely connected with the
symbolic construction and preservation of the Anglophone identrty andhentage
and to be instrumental in raising Anglophone consciousness (Jua & Konings
forthcoming). ,
Like other Anglophone movements, the SCYL refuses to recogmze the
government's designation of 20 May - the date of the Inauguration of the
unitary state in 1972 - as the country's National Day. It has contmued to boycott
its celebrations, declaring 20 May as a 'Day of Mournmg' and a 'Day oi
Shame' It also indicts the regime for declaring 11 February - the day of the
1961 plebiscite - as Youth Day. It sees the persistent failure of the government
to highlight the historical significance of this day as a conscious attempt to
reconfigure national history. It has thus called upon the Anglophone population
to mark 11 February as the 'Day of the Plebiscite' and l October as the Day of
Independence' as alternative days of national celebration. On these days, it has
frequently attempted to hoist the Southern Cameroons flag; attempts that were
often brutally challenged by the security forces.
A o u g g o v e r n m e n authorities regularly allege that Anglophone leaders have
.mported laVquantit- of weapons, the 1997 SCYL revolt was camed out wUh bows
and arrows, hunting guns and a few pistols captured from gendarmes.
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Road signs also became a focus of SCYL protest action during the
millennium year when the regime decided to put up French-only road signs on
the Douala-Victoria (Limbe) road, the so-called reunification road linking
Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon. Irked by what it perceived as signs of
recolonization, the SCYL then sprayed black paint on all the French road signs.
The use of black paint was significant as it is the colour of mourning.
A few years later, in May 2002, the SCYL, together with 'SCNC North
America', undertook a spectacular action called 'Operation Stamp Your
Identity'. Eighteen thousand bumper stickers calling for the creation of a federal
republic in Anglophone Cameroon were printed in the United States and sent to
Anglophone Cameroon. They were symbolically flagged in Anglophone towns
on 20 May 2002, the day that Cameroon celebrated its 30* anniversary of being
a unitary state. On l October of the same year when Southern Cameroonians
were celebrating their independence day, the Secretary-General of the SCYL,
Lucas Cho Ayaba, who is living in exile in Germany, together with other SCYL
members and sympathizers, took over the Cameroonian embassy in Bonn and
hoisted the Southern Cameroonian flag on top of the building.20
The Cameroonian government still sees the SCYL as the most dangerous
Anglophone movement. It has therefore become the main target not only of the
security forces but also of the newly created youth militia.
President Biya's Youths (PRESBY)
PRESBY was founded in Yaoundé in 1996 as the successor of the Committee
for Self-Defence that had been operating at the University of Yaoundé. It was
an attempt by the regime to transform a local, almost exclusively Beti, militia
into a nationwide militia to fight opponents of the regime, including the SCYL.
To attract a nationwide membership, it shifted the objective of the new group
from the protection of Beti interests to the promotion of President Biya's New
Deal policies, which became the regime's ideological basis after Biya's
accession to power.
Soon after Paul Biya succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo as president on 6
November 1982, hè proposed a New Deal to the Cameroonian people. The New
Deal policy guidelines were political liberalization, rigour and moralization, and
national integration. They were intended to bring about a state characterized by
a larger degree of individual liberty and a freer exchange of ideas, the judicious
and stringent management of public affairs, transparency and public account-
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ability by government officials, as well as a total absence of ethno-regional
particularism and favouritism (Biya 1987, Krieger & Takougang 1998). It
quickly became evident, however, that the New Deal policy guidelines were
mere slogans, probably used by Biya to distance himself from Ahidjo's shadow
(Konings 1996: 250). Political liberalization proved to be limited. Corruption
and mismanagement in public life reached unprecedented levels, and Trans-
parency International designated Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the
world in 1998. National integration turned out to be an ideological justifïcation
for effacing and assimilating the Anglophone cultural legacy. Moreover, there
was a growing monopolization of economie and political power by the Beti, the
president's ethnic group. The ruling CPDM party has nevertheless continued to
present Paul Biya as the 'Man of the New Deal' and to praise his wonderful
achievements.
Since its foundation, PRESBY has indeed extended its influence to all
regions in Cameroon, recruiting members among similar youth groups such as
the SCYL. In 2001, it was estimated that the new organization comprised
120,000 members and 7,900 officials (Fokwang 2002: 13). Despite its national
claims, it should not be forgotten that the Beti still continue to control the
organization to a large extent and Beti members residing in various regions of
the country have been used as vectors for expanding its sphere of influence,
mostly initiating the launch of local chapters in their areas of residence. While
autochthonous youths have adopted leadership roles at the local level, Beti
youths still occupy most leadership positions at the national level. PRESBY's
founder and self-imposed president, Philomon Ntyam Ntyam, is a Beti and
other members of this ethnic group occupy three-quarters of the seats in
PRESBY's National Bureau.
Far from being an apolitical organization as it has continued to claim,
PRESBY is clearly affïliated to the ruling party. Not only is Philomon Ntyam
Ntyam a member of the Central Committee of the CPDM but members of the
group are also sooner or later expected to obtain CPDM membership cards. It
enjoys widespread support and patronage from the CPDM elite. CPDM bigwigs
openly attend and fund elections in the various local organs of PRESBY and
when PRESBY in the South West Province organized a seminar in Mutengene
in September 2001, Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge, a South Westerner
himself, requested that all the heads of regional ministries contribute to its
funding. In Cameroon, where officials owe their appointments to the president
or prime minister, such a request is tantamount to an order (Jua forthcoming).
PRESBY members appear not to have lost faith in the neo-patrimonial state,
the essence of which two leading Anglophone government members, Prime
20 SCYL, 'Today is Independence Day', BSCNatwn, l October 2002.
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Minister Simon Achidi Achu (1992-96) and nis successor Peter Mafany
Musonge (1996-present),21 have defmed as follows: 'politics na njangi"22 and
'the politics of you scratch my back, Fll scratch yours', both meaning quidpro
quo or 'one good turn deserves another' (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997: 214).
Unlike SCYL members, the Anglophone members of PRESBY publicly declare
that they are being prepared to support and forcibly defend the Francophone-
dominated unitary state in exchange for favours, including admission to the
prestigieus grand écoles like the Ecole Nationale Supérieure (ENS) and Ecole
Nationale d'Administration et de Magistratlire (ENAM), employment in the
civil service and public sector, and assistance in the setting up or expansion of
business - favours which are often denied to non-members nowadays. They tend
to look upon PRESBY as a vehicle through which they can lobby for a share in
the national cake and thus obtain access to adulthood and even elite status.
PRESBY leaders have constantly emphasized reciprocal exchange. For
example, during a trip to Bui Division in the North West Province in September
2001, Mr Roger Penandjo, one of PRESBY's leaders responsible for national
missions, is said to have promised government favours to youths of the division
who joined the organization. He then presented thirty forms to PRESBY
members who had the minimum qualification of GCE Advanced Level to apply
for Bangladeshi scholarships. After the presentation, he told his audience: 'So
you see that it is only when you join PRESBY that you can have these
opportunities' (Fokwang 2002: 12).
It should, however, be noted that, compared to SCYL members, PRESBY
members tend to show less commitment to their organization's objectives.
During my interviews, some confessed that they 'support the Anglophone cause
with their hearts in private, but pretend to speak against it in public to protect
their positions'.23 They claimed that they had joined PRESBY for no other
reason than to get sinecures, pointing out that even their elders in power,
including the Man of the New Deal, Paul Biya, did not live up to the lofty ideals
21 Their appointment in the 1990s shows that the Anglophone problem has, paradoxi-
cally, enhanced the chances of pro-government Anglophone elites being appointed to
government posts which used to be reserved for Francophones only. Obviously the
decision to improve the position of Anglophones in the state apparatus is designed to
belie charges that they only play second fiddle in the Francophone-dominated unitary
state, and simultaneously to attract new members of the Anglophone elite into the
hegemonie alliance.
22 This is a Pidgin-English expression meaning 'politics is like a rotating credit asso-
ciation'.
23 More and more Anglophone CPDM members are making similar confessions now-
adays. See The Post, l February 2000, p. 3.
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of the New Deal. In their view, the latter only displayed 'rigour in corruption',
perceiving the state as a source of spoils to be plundered without remorse.
Moreover, a considerable number of PRESBY members were disappointed
when they discovered that the number and range of prebends offered by their
organization were limited. This largely explains the fluid nature of the
organization's membership, the continuous struggles for power among its
leadership, and the emergence of new youth groups - with objectives similar to
those of PRESBY - eager to gain access to state resources by any means
possible.Although the PRESBY leadership often created the illusion that all the
members would be rewarded for their services, the reality was, to paraphrase
the Bible, that, in the end, many were called but few were chosen. This Situation
had an ambivalent effect on the organization's membership: on the one hand, a
number of the existing membership decided to resign from the organization,
their hopes never having been fulfilled, but on the other, the relatively few
success stories attracted new members.
Unsurprisingly, access to the state was guaranteed mostly to the group's
leadership. Due to PRESBY's strategie position as a militia in the patron-client
nerworks in Cameroon, its leaders tend to be regarded as power brokers who
can hold people to ransom and are feared even by provincial governors.
Leadership positions are highly contested as was demonstrated by the power
struggles in the South West Province in 2000. The Regional Secretary, Enow
Charles Eseme, accused the Regional Coördinator, Mayengi Thomas Kendi, of
being involved in criminal activities. He alleged that Kendi was in the habit of
extorting money from young people who wanted to migrate to Europe and the
United States in search of greener pasrures, promising mem that hè would use
his influence to obtain visas for them. Eventually, Eseme was able to replace
him at the helm of the organization, but once in power hè embarked on similar
activities. Exploiting his supposed connections with the regime, hè extorted
money from the various parastatals in the South West Province as well as from
state employees by either threatening them with punitive transfers or by
promising them promotions. In 2000, the North West chapter of PRESBY spent
the entire year fighting over leadership positions, which eventually resulted in
the resignation of its president (Jua forthcoming).
Similarly, a group of leaders who had been working closely with the
National President of PRESBY blamed him for 'eating' alone and decided to
form an organization of their own, the so-called Youths for the Support of
Those in Power (YOSUPO). The objective of this new group, they claimed, was
to extend youth support from President Paul Biya to the entire leadership of the
ruling regime. The initiative was folio wed by the creation of other youth groups
such as L'Association des Camerounais Biyaristes (ACB), the Movement for
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Youths of the Presidential Majority (MYPM) and the Jeunesse Active pour
Chantal Biya (JACHABI) (Fokwang 2002).24 Against this background, one can
begin to understand the lack of cooperation between these organizations in spite
of their similar objectives. Evidently, cooperation would reduce the political
space of these organizations and the leverage of their leaders.
Since its foundation, PRESBY has been used by the Francophone-dominated
state to counteract the activities of Anglophone movements and parties such as
the SDF, the SCNC and particularly the SCYL. It has been regularly engaged in
using violence to disrupt their meetings, rallies and demonstrations and to
terrorize their individual members. Like the former Committee for Self-
Defence, PRESBY members are armed and receive active and open support
from the security forces. One of their actions in early January 2001 received a
lot of publicity, occurring as it did just a few days before the Franco-African
Summit in Yaoundé. On that occasion, PRESBY members disturbed a peaceful
SDF rally and attacked participants in the presence of security forces.25 Since
the declaration of Southern Cameroons' independence by Justice Frederick
Ebong on 30 December 1999 and the subsequent revival of SCNC and SCYL
activities, PRESBY members have been openly requested by CPDM and
government officials to clamp down on Anglophone secessionists - a request
they have promised to carry out religiously.
Conclusion
The importance of student politics in Africa during economie and political
liberalization cannot be underestimated. The present generation of African
students is not only being confronted with growing marginalization during
economie liberalization but has also acquired more space during political
liberalization to articulate its grievances and to organize in defence of its
interests against the ruling political elite whom it holds responsible for its
predicament.
My case study of Anglophone students, however, cautions against treating
students as a homogeneous category. Although the Anglophone students of
today feel even more marginalized because of their Anglophone identity than
their Francophone counterparts, they have actually displayed a rather ambi-
valent attitude towards the Francophone-dominated state. On the one hand,
there are students who are seen as rebels by the regime and as heroes by the
24 Chantal Biya is the president's wife.
25 See The Post, 15 January 2001, p. 3; and Le Messager, 15 January 2001, p. 5
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Anglophone population. They fïrst played a vanguard role in Anglophone
protests and later, during the political liberalization era, joined the Anglophone
struggle for an independent Anglophone state, which they saw as a precondition
for a better future for themselves and the Anglophone community as a whole.
Having learnt during the heyday of 'Parliament' at the University of Yaoundé
that violence is a more effective weapon than dialogue to press home demands
with the autocratie state, the leaders of the most militant Anglophone organi-
zation, the SCYL, soon opted for armed struggle to achieve the desired
independence. This caused a generational conflict within the Anglophone
movement itself, the Anglophone elite clinging to a strategy of achieving
independence through dialogue with the regime in spite of the Biya govern-
ment's persistent refusal to enter into any meaningful negotiation with the
Anglophone movements.
On the other hand, there are students who are seen by the Anglophone
population as both predators and victims of the regime. They are prepared to
support and defend the Francophone-dominated unitary state in exchange for a
share in the ever-diminishing state resources. The regime, in turn, expects them
to join the newly created militia organizations such as the Committee for Self-
Defence and PRESBY, with a view to challenging the Anglophone associations
and parties.
Studies of student politics in other African countries such as Ethiopia
(Tiruneh 1990), Nigeria (Lebeau & Ogunsanya 2000), South Africa (Seekings
1993) and Senegal and Mali (Wigram 1993) provide evidence that the
ambiguity of student politics is not restricted to Cameroon alone.
While PRESBY has greatly expanded its membership among the educated
Anglophone youth in recent years, the role of the SCYL instead appears to have
been drastically reduced. Following the government's brutal repression of the
SCYL's ill-planned 1997 revolt, most of its leaders have either been imprisoned
or have fled the country. Of course, this does not mean that the government has
finally defeated the SCYL. It is still operating underground and is engaged in a
variety of Internet and boycott activities. One of its actions was the spectacular
liberation in 1993 of its chairman, Mr Ebenezer Akwanga, from the Kondengui
maximum security prison in Yaoundé where hè was serving a 20-year jail
sentence for secessionist activities. Nevertheless, severe government repression
of SCYL activities has discouraged the educated Anglophone youth from
joining the organization. The SCYL will, therefore, inevitably continue to
occupy a minority position within the Anglophone movements that are
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Past the Kalashnikov: Youth,
politics and the state in Eritrea
Sara Rieh Dorman
Since 1991 Eritrea has faced certain speciftc challenges in the
process of nation-building: hoW to transform a war-stncken
economy and hoW to relate the farmer liberation movement to
the citizens of the neW state. This chapter emmines the Ways m
Which the youth of the independent state have become central to
conceptions ofEritrean statehood and nationalism. The chapter
proposes that since independence the relationship bekeen
youth and the state has been typified by mobilization and
limited pluralism. The liberation War that brought independ-
ence also incurred obligations to the older generations of
fighters, which the youth have to 'pay back'. Education and
employment opportunities are administered and allocated ma
top-doWnfashion. In return, youth are expected to follOW the
paths set out for them, contribute to development and serve m
the military. Especially since 2001 hoever, Eritrean youth
have questioned and rejected these expectations and obligations
challenging the conditions under which Students provide
voluntary work, and fleeing national service. In doingso, the
youth fundamentally challenge the nature of the post-hberation
state, its definitions of ciüzenship, and the post- 1 99 1 regime
itself.
The
of youth is just incredible ... almost every tegadelai [fighter] accepts
fan inevitable outcome of his or her love and loyalty to country
ut our youth go far beyond that ... especi-lly now that they are
about to go to the place of their dreams, the frontlme ....
